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Abstract 
This study examined the drafting practices of teams in the American League East Division and 
the business implications that correspond to these results. Each team has their own drafting 
strategy and by analyzing this you will gain a better understanding as to why certain decisions 
are made. The research explored the relationship between teams in the American League East 
with regards to when and how to draft players. To answer this question an analysis of each of 
these five team’s draft picks from 1998-2007 was completed by comparing each draftee by point 
of entry and round drafted in. The results show a clear correlation for each team in regards to the 
round a type of player was drafted and the position they play. Finally, after analyzing all of the 
data insights into preferential business practices of the teams are explored.  
.     
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American League East Draft Tendencies 
The Major League Baseball Draft is a very long and confusing event but it drastically 
shapes the entire organization each year. There are typically fifty rounds that take place each 
year not including compensation round picks (Siegel, 2004). General Managers have an immense 
amount of pressure on themselves to accurately predict who to draft and when to draft players. 
  There are many different ways to look at the possible explanation of the team’s draft 
practices. Some organizations may prefer to draft an athlete out of high school in hopes of 
conforming them to the team’s organizational beliefs and ideals. On the other hand other teams 
may prefer to draft a player that is more developed and matured out of college. Drafting a player 
out of college could then in return allow them to possibly move through their minor league 
system faster and have a greater impact sooner. This then leads into the business practices of the 
organization and ultimately what their draft practices are. Often a team will have to offer an 
athlete who was drafted out of high school more money as an incentive to join the organization 
and decide not to attend college (Lewis, 2003). Whereas an athlete drafted after completing 
college has little bargaining power because they do not have the fall back plan of going back to 
school to continue their career. There are both positive and negative aspects for each premise 
mentioned and researching this idea will provide information on whether certain teams have a 
philosophy about the optimal time to draft a player. If you have an interest in baseball and want 
to learn more about the draft this investigation will provide you with a detailed account into the 
strategies of five teams and their business implications. 
Literature Review 
There are a number of variables that come into play when teams are determining when 
and where to draft each player. The three factors that most affect draft stock are physiological 
factors, psychological factors, and financial implications towards teams. Seeing as every team 
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has different resources and different backgrounds it can be assumed that each of their strategies 
and beliefs for their particular practices in regards to the variables or factors outlined will also 
vary. 
 The first variable that will be analyzed is physiology of potential draft choices and this 
will be broken down into three categories including, physical development, injury concerns and 
team’s workout regimen. Starting with physical development when the body is brought to peak 
condition and the mind is completely focused, an individual can achieve the extraordinary 
(Tolson, Kleiner, & Marcus, 2000). One standpoint believes that it is more beneficial to draft 
younger players out of high school so you can sign them before they are finished maturing. This 
way they can develop through your minor league system, train with your trainers, and become 
familiar with the organizational beliefs (Ebben, Hintz, & Simenz, 2005). The other perspective 
feels that there is too much of a risk when drafting high-school athletes. For the most part the 
players are not fully matured and relatively unchallenged so you are drafting on potential which 
is usually risky and inconsistent (Bradbury, 2009). They would rather view a player’s 
progression and see how they fare at a more competitive level before fully investing in them.  
In an article about major league baseball players career lengths it was quoted that “Most 
likely, players who start at younger ages will enjoy longer careers because they may have 
demonstrated promise early on; may have faster reaction time, speed, and muscle mass; may be 
less prone to injury; and if injured, may recover more quickly” (Shulz et. al. as cited from 
Witnauer & Rogers, 2007, p. 373). This study endorses the idea of drafting a player earlier 
because of familiarity and injury concerns. Further support comes from an article published by 
individuals from the Marquette University Program in Exercise Science which discusses the 
different strategies and types of lifts emphasized by each team and wanting their players to 
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follow (Ebben, Hintz, & Simenz, 2005). This shows that if teams have strong exercise ideals 
then they feel that they could maximize the player’s potential through their strength training 
program.  If a team does wait they could be risking the possibility of allowing most of this 
development to come during college where they have no impact and input into the athlete’s 
workout regimen.  
In contrast to that belief, a study published in the Journal of Sport Sciences reported that 
baseball athletes do not reach their peak preforming level until age 29 as a hitter and age 28 as a 
pitcher (Bradbury, 2009). This study also shows dramatic increases in peak performing levels 
when a player is twenty three as opposed to twenty two and again when a player is twenty five 
(Bradbury, 2009). Based on this data it would make sense to wait and draft an older player 
because they will still experience a significant increase in peak preforming levels, it would just 
occur within the first few years with the organization. This supports the idea of drafting a player 
out of college so they can have an impact on your major league team faster. Another beneficial 
study that was done supporting this idea entitled “Anthropometric and Performance Comparisons 
in Professional Baseball Players” analyzed a number of specific performance variables and 
compared them at each of the professional ranks (Hoffman, Vazquez, Pichardo & Tenenbaum, 
2009). This study compared anthropometric and performance variables in professional baseball 
players and examined the relationship between these variables and baseball-specific performance 
(Hoffman et. al, 2009). The idea of this does not specifically support one physiological position 
but if used, teams could put an athlete they are considering drafting through this performance 
study and analyze where they fall with the averages of each professional level and determine if 
they want to draft that player. The athlete could be a player out of high school with abnormally 
high results and feel that it is worth the investment or possible the athlete is a player from college 
DRAFT TENDENCIES   6 
 
 
 
who is more mature and projects at a high professional level immediately. So if used this idea 
could support and reject the beliefs from each viewpoint.  
The next factor that will be analyzed is the psychological background and readiness of 
the athlete. Psychological readiness varies between athletes and the maturing process does not 
happen on a continuum (Patsiaquras, 2008). This then has teams questioning whether to have an 
athlete experience college and spend more time learning and maturing or high school. The article 
“Does Education Matter” explores this link between education and health benefits.  
“One theory suggests that the positive education–health link is causal, because 
education makes people more efficient producers of health —that is, people with 
more education better understand how to stay healthy by using and combining 
various resources, such as food, exercise, and medical inputs, and are more likely 
to recognize health problems and better articulate those problems to health care 
providers” (Grossman, 1972 as cited in Kalist & Peng, 2007, p. 654).  
 
Later in the article the authors said  
“However, it can be argued that MLB players are well informed on the production 
of good health, regardless of their formal education. In many cases, these athletes 
have their own personal trainers in addition to being under the watchful eye of 
their team’s trainers, strength and conditioning coaches, and physicians (Kalist & 
Peng, 2007, p. 654).  
 
So the real question from this article is whether or not the younger athletes are being educated by 
their organizations sufficiently enough to compensate for the lack of formal education.  
Another important factor of psychology is the idea of athlete burnout. “Burnout is like a 
candle that once glowed brightly, began to flicker, and eventually extinguished. This analogy 
suggests the image of bright, promising young athletes who get fed up with sport participation 
and stop competing at what should be the top of their career” (Raedeke, Lunney & Venables, 
2002, p. 181). If you are drafted out of high school in June and are assigned to a professional 
team you actually get sent to a team immediately upon signing your contract. Then your season 
will not finish until September, continuing upon the high school season you have already 
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completed and thus extending the amount of time and the number of game you end up playing 
dramatically. Athletes who are not accustomed or prepared for the professional schedule could 
be increasingly susceptible to burnout (Raedeke et al., 2002). This leads to the uncertainty of 
whether the experience will be beneficial or if it is too much for someone of that age.  
Finally, financial perspectives always have an influence even though there are different 
ways of viewing what is more cost effective. Some people believe that by drafting a player out of 
high school you are able to draft them before they reach their potential therefor getting them at a 
bargain price initially instead of waiting three years for when he is eligible again (Lewis, 2003). 
The other view is that there is too much uncertainty with high school athletes and it is better to 
draft someone you have seen excel that way eliminating much of the hesitation you may have 
originally had. A perfect example of these two different approaches comes from two players that 
have recently been drafted. One of these players was drafted in the 42
nd
 round out of high school. 
This athlete received a signing bonus of $120,000 plus college paid for up to the price he would 
have paid if had did attend the four year institute he was committed to (B. Bostick, personal 
communication, November 19
th
, 2011). The other player that was drafted was chosen in the 25
th
 
round but he had completed college. The signing bonus he received was for less than $1,000 with 
no other incentives included (D. Jurik, personal communication, November 10
th
, 2011). This 
disparity can be attributed to the fact that the team drafting the high school player did not want to 
lose him to the college he committed to earlier. The other draftee did not really have any choice 
but to accept his deal if he wanted to play professionally because he could not go back and play 
in school. This real life example shows the difference in bargaining between players of different 
draft statuses and the financial impact it can have for the teams drafting the athletes.  
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This research will attempt to uncover any correlations in teams drafting strategies and 
provide insight into their business model. Answering this question will provide valuable 
information about each team’s priority and beliefs in regards to draft choices. Each player is an 
investment and an asset who will be assigned to a team within the farm system and will develop 
from there. These decisions have to be made for the overall benefit of the organization and 
learning the ideals of each team will allow everyone to see their choice of action.  
Method 
Sampling Procedures 
The population of this study is every Major League Baseball team and the specific 
sample analyzed is the group of American League East Teams: the New York Yankees, Boston 
Red Sox, Tampa Bay Rays, Toronto Blue Jays, and the Baltimore Orioles. The American League 
East is a perfect division to study because it consists of two large market teams, an extremely 
small market team, and also two other teams that fall within the range of those three. Examining 
these five teams provides a great sample due to the variety and differential of the teams. Also the 
small market team has won the division twice in the last four years and made the playoffs in 
three of the last four years which will make the study even more interesting to see what if 
anything are they doing differently to succeed. Finally, the years of 1998-2007 were chosen to 
provide a lengthy time period to analyze while also to allowing the players drafted to work their 
way through the minor leagues and contribute to their Major League team. 
Measures and Operational Definitions 
In this study the drafted players were organized by team according to year selected and 
the selection number they were chosen. An additional comparison was the point of entry into the 
draft (whether they were selected out of high school, junior college, or from a four year 
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institute). In order to be draft eligible you must follow these requirements “Graduating high 
school seniors who have not yet attended college, junior college players, players attending a 
four-year college and have completed their third year, and players who turn twenty-one-years old 
within forty-five days of the draft are all eligible for the draft” (Cafagna, Farrel, & Hazen, 2006, 
p. 696). These statistics were decided because they are the main forms of reference prevalent in 
the major leagues of an extended period of time.    
This will be determined by the number of players that reached the major leagues and the 
extent of their achievements. Their success will be determined by nine different statistical 
categories, four primarily geared towards position players and five towards pitchers. These 
statistics include: batting average, home runs, runs batted in and stolen bases for position players, 
then for pitchers wins, losses, earned run average, saves, and strikeouts (see Appendix A for the 
formal definitions of each of these statistics).  
Research Design 
The content analysis of this study was conducted on the five teams from the American 
League East in the years of 1998-2007 and each of their draft selection. Using 
http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/history/draft/draft.jsp, five different charts were created, one for each 
team studied.  Charts were built by adding player name, draft year, position in the draft, point of 
entry into the draft, and the nine different statistical categories. Then after sorting the data chart 
was made comparing the total statistics, the total number of players drafted from each point of 
entry, and the total number of players from each point of entry reaching the major leagues (See 
appendix C). Finally the information was translated into SPSS to find the correlations of each 
team in reference to the point of entry and round selected plus the position played and round 
selected.   
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Data Analysis 
When studying the groups of the players drafted by each team this research tried to 
discover if there are any correlations for each team. The areas that were examined include 
whether the round selected is affected by the players point of entry into the draft and if there is a 
tie to the market size of the franchise and the average number of players from each group. Then 
when that was completed, further statistical analysis of the player’s contributions to the major 
league team was done to discover the success of the teams and their drafting strategies. Along 
with that, a listing of each player’s position is compared to the round they were selected 
determining the correlation between the two. Additionally, the total statistics for each of the 
players reaching the major leagues will be grouped by team and compared to the other team’s 
totals. This was done to easily organize and sort the different variables showing the possibility of 
possible correlations within the data set. After the players have been grouped on the factors of 
round selected and point of entry along with round drafted and position played, an analysis was 
done to look for correlations and patterns, among each team and also if the market of the team 
impacts the drafting ideals of the organization. In addition to the analysis of the type of player 
drafted and their position played further examination will be done as to the success of each 
player drafted and as a total for the team.  
 Results 
 In the ten year period being examined from 1998-2007 the Baltimore Orioles drafted 496 
players. Of these 496 players 204 of them year were drafted out of high school, 48 of them were 
drafted out of junior college and 244 of them were drafted from a four year institute. Only sixty 
of the players drafted in these ten years made it to the Major Leagues, twenty one from high 
school, four from junior college, and thirty five from a four year institute. The Orioles also had a 
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-.174 significant correlation between the round in which a player was drafted and their point of 
entry into the draft, and a -.03 correlation in regards to the round a player was drafted and their 
position. When looking at the total statistics from the Orioles’ draftees and the players reaching 
the Major Leagues they did not have a great deal of success. On average they finished third or 
fourth in many of the statistical categories. Their pitching staff did show more success that the 
position players but overall within the division they Orioles drafting was mediocre. 
Now looking at the Boston Red Sox they drafted 497 players in the ten years. 204 of 
these players came from high school, 42 of them were drafted out of a junior college and 251 of 
the players attended a four year institute. The Red Sox did have sixty nine players reach the 
major leagues and make contributions to their team. Twenty three of the players to reach the 
MLB were drafted out of high school, five of them were from a junior college, and thirty five of 
them came from a four year institute. The correlation of the Red Sox for the round they drafted a 
player and their point of entry is -.162 significance; the correlation for the round they draft a 
player in and the position they play .052. The statistics from the Boston Red Sox’s draftees were 
above average in reference to the other teams in the American League East. For the most part the 
Red Sox finished in second or third in the nine statistical categories outlined. The Red Sox did 
lead the American League East in the saves category.  
The New York Yankees have drafted the most players (n=504) among the five teams 
over the ten year span. The Yankees selected 181 high school athletes, 62 junior college players, 
and 261 players from a four year institute. The 62 junior college players are also the most of any 
of the teams studied. When looking at the round they draft a player and their point of entry the 
Yankees had a -.243 significant correlation. Then for the round they draft a player and position 
which they play their correlation was -.02. The draft selections by the Yankees during this ten 
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year period did not have a great deal of influence on the Yankees roster and statistics. The 
Yankees finished near or at the bottom of all the statistical categories especially with the position 
players where they were last in all four of those categories.   
The Tampa Bay Rays over the course of the ten year period drafted 495 players. The 
Rays though did progress more players than any of the other four teams having 83 of the players 
drafted make it to the major leagues. Of the 83 players to make it to the major leagues forty 
seven of them were drafted out of high school, eight of them were from a junior college, and 
twenty eight of them attended a four year institute. The forty seven high school athletes to reach 
the major leagues is more than double the amount for any of the other teams. Tampa Bay was the 
only team to have a positive correlation in regards to the round in which a player was selected 
and their point of entry into the draft with that being .016. The Rays were also the only team to 
have a significant correlation between the round a player was selected and the position of the 
player and this was -.121. The Tampa Bay Rays were by far the most successful team with 
drafting players that would help impact their major league team. The Rays compared to the other 
teams in the American League East finished first in almost every total statistical category and 
near the top in the average statistical categories.   
The Toronto Blue Jays drafted the least number of players compared to the other teams in 
the American League East only selecting 484 from 1998-2007. They also had the least number of 
players reach the major leagues and contribute to the team with only fifty seven. Surprisingly, 
the Blue Jays did record the most players reaching the MLB from a four year institute with forty 
two. Unfortunately, they had the fewest players reach the major leagues from both high school 
with thirteen and junior College with two. Their correlation between the round in which they 
selected a player and their point of entry into the draft was -.187, and the correlation for the 
DRAFT TENDENCIES   13 
 
 
 
round in which they selected a player and the position they play was .038. The Toronto Blue Jays 
did not have much success developing their draft choices during this ten year span. Not only did 
they have the least amount of players reach the major leagues they also produced the second 
worst overall results of the statistics examined. The New York Yankees were the only other team 
to collectively have worse results from their draftees during this span. Unfortunately, for the 
Blue Jays because the Yankees are in a larger market and generate more revenue they are able to 
compensate for that by signing more players in free agency. The Blue Jays though are unable to 
spend a great deal of money on their overall salary to make up for the lack of player development 
through the draft because their revenue generated in not nearly as high. This is a bad 
combination and is most likely the reason why the Blue Jays did not make the playoffs during 
the time period studied and not since 1993.  
A closer comparison of all of these results can be found in Appendix C and Appendix D. 
These appendices categorize each element used to analyze the results by placing the five teams 
in alphabetical order with findings. Each element is separated into a different table in order to 
view to corresponding data of each team with that of the other teams. This allows for an easier 
comparison when associating the data for each team and their results.  
Discussion 
This study sought to explore if the five teams in the American League East had specific 
drafting procedures and also whether their market size had any effect on those ideals. It was 
discovered that each team had a basic strategy that it followed throughout most of the drafts 
leading to significant correlations from the data sets. One important finding is the uniqueness of 
the Tampa Bay Rays and the success they had overall. The Rays have had more players reach the 
major leagues and as a whole their statistics are far and away better than any of the other four 
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organizations. When looking at the correlations for each team between the rounds they selected a 
player and the point of entry the Rays were the only ones with a positive correlation. This means 
that the Rays were the only team to draft high school athletes earlier on with junior college in the 
middle and four year institute athletes later in the draft. Each of the other four teams had 
significant negative correlations meaning that they drafted in the opposite order four year 
institute athletes first then junior college and finally high school athletes last.  
When looking at the results, the Rays had the most players reach the MLB and a 
significant amount of those players were drafted out of high school (see Appendix C). This 
shows the benefit generated by the Rays focusing on high school athletes while the other teams 
prioritized players from four year institutes. In addition to these correlations the Rays were also 
the only team to have a significant negative correlation in regards to the variables of round 
selected and the position of the player selected. The Orioles, Yankees and Blue Jays also had 
negative correlations for these variables also but the correlations were not significant. The Red 
Sox were the only team with a positive correlation though the correlation was not significant. 
This shows that the Red Sox ranked pitchers as their top priority and selected them in the 
beginning of the draft, then moving to infielders and finally outfielders. With a significant 
negative correlation this means that the Rays prioritized position players first in the drafted and 
then later shifted to pitchers. With this correlation it shows that the Rays favor position players 
from high school and pitchers who are more proven from junior college and four year institutes. 
With these correlations and the resulting ideas practiced the Rays have demonstrated to be the 
benchmark in the American League East with regards to drafting and developing players to make 
contributions for their major league team. 
Conclusion 
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Comparing correlations among the five teams in regards to point of entry and round 
selected plus position played and round selected provides a greater sense of clarity not only for 
what each team has done when drafting but the success they have had. After going through and 
analyzing the type of player each team drafted and when, this study went more in-depth by 
looking at each player categorized by point of entry into the draft and how successful each was. 
Success was determined by nine different major league statistics and was calculated by totaling 
each team’s draftees and the statistics the compiled with that franchise in the MLB. Creating this 
data set expanded upon the first set of results and built off the question of why a team drafts a 
player where they do, to including the most successful draft statuses plus the round and position 
to select a player. The composition of this data will be valuable for general managers to see what 
have been the most beneficial strategies and what have been the least successful. Interpretation 
of the results could then lead to general managers into formulating their own strategies.  
Based on the results it appears that the Tampa Bay Rays have a strategy for drafting 
which has helped them remain extremely competitive in the American League East Division 
despite having the smallest market by far. This strategy of drafting high school athletes first and 
athletes from four year institutes later along with waiting on drafting pitchers until later in the 
draft proved to be essential to their success. The Rays drafted at least thirty four more high 
school athletes than any of the other teams in the American League East. Also they had fourteen 
more players from these drafts reach the major leagues and contribute to the team. Additionally, 
of the total number of players they Rays drafted seventeen percent of them reached the major 
leagues, the next highest was fourteen percent. Based on the correlations it appears that teams 
should first look at high school athletes and progress to players from four year institutes later in 
the draft. Also, waiting on pitching until on in the draft has shown to be more beneficial.  
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After analyzing the choices of the Rays it appears that they want to take risks on players 
out of high school. This shows that they want to draft players before they reach their full 
potential and are forced to pay them significantly more money. Also, going along with that by 
doing this they have the opportunity to shape the workout regime in the fashion they feel best 
suits the player. Plus, they do not feel that it is necessary for a potential athlete to be formally 
educated into health concerns as they can provide those services through personal team trainers. 
General Managers can benefit from viewing these tendencies of the Tampa Bay Rays and 
determining what has been successful for them and then establishing how then can optimize 
these results for their own team.  
The New York Yankees’ drafting practices on the other hand oppose those of the Tampa 
Bay Rays and thus have caused them to be the least successful team in regards to the statistics of 
drafted players. The Yankees had s significant negative correlation when comparing the round of 
a player drafted and their point of entry while the Rays had a positive correlation. Also the 
Yankees had a very low negative correlation for the position of a player and the round they were 
selected and the Rays had a strong significant negative correlation. This means that even though 
both the Yankees and Rays had negative correlations the Yankees did not have a real concerted 
focus to draft that way. With a low negative correlation there is not a strong connection from the 
round a player was drafted and the position they play only a general trend. The Rays with a 
significant negative correlation show that they are committed to this practice and follow it each 
year. With these differences it is not surprising to see that the Yankees did not experience the 
success the Rays had with their draftees. Their strategies completely oppose each other and their 
emphases are different. The Rays do not have the luxury the Yankees have to compensate their 
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poor drafting by signing free agents, the Rays are a small market and need to rely on scouting for 
their drafts and player development.  
Limitations 
 There are many limitations that come within this research in the overall scope of the 
major leagues and what the research shows. First with the small sample size of the American 
League East it is hard to compare what is considered successful and what is not. If you were able 
to look at a greater sample size success would become more apparent and the results would mean 
more. Another limitation is what the previous drafts it is extremely possible that some of the less 
successful teams may have drafted and developed a player that started for them during the 
duration of the time span studied. This could skew the data and the results drawn from it.  
A final limitation involved the possible trades of players. When a player that was a part 
of the data set is traded from that team, but remains in the major leagues, this process discounts 
that as continued years of service. The player(s) in this instance even though they did not directly 
help your team the player(s) received may have. Completing this research and analyzing the 
results is not a perfect science especially since it has never really been completed before but even 
with the results determined a lot can be gained from the information.     
Direction for Future Research 
 This research has an immense amount of possibilities in which could be built off of it. 
One way is to further examine these teams and the players drafted to analyze each player’s 
success in the different levels of the organization in the minor leagues. This would provide 
additional information as to which type of players advance the furthest and who generally has the 
most success. Another way to expand upon this research is to compare each team in Major 
League Baseball instead of just the teams in the American League East. With this information 
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there would be a greater reliability in the overall results and conclusions drawn. Further 
comparisons could examine the National League teams and the American League teams since 
there is a different style of play considering the designator hitter in the American League. It 
would be interesting to see if there were significant differences in the philosophies of the teams 
in the different leagues along with determining if there is one universal method that seems to be 
the most successful throughout all of the MLB. Both of these further developments of the 
research would provide additional information that would greatly enhance the information 
gathered on a smaller sample size of the American League East and the success of the draftees in 
Major League Baseball.    
 With this study Major League Baseball General Managers can use this information to 
compare their own drafting strategies with those of the successful and unsuccessful members of 
the American League East. By comparing the strategies hopefully they will be able to enhance 
their previous ideas and develop an even more effective approach for drafting. Also, for readers 
who are not general managers they should be able to learn more about the MLB Amateur draft 
and how teams decide on whom to select when. Plus, they will see actual results from previous 
drafts with the correlations of the teams showing how they prioritize their potential draftees. 
With this new knowledge and a greater audience maybe the MLB draft despite its fifty rounds 
will receive more coverage and attention each year for the fans.  
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Appendix A 
Statistical Definitions: 
 “A base hit is a statistic credited to a batter when such batter reaches base safely, as set forth in 
this Rule 10.05. 
(a) The official scorer shall credit a batter with a base hit when: 
(1) the batter reaches first base (or any succeeding base) safely on a fair ball that settles on the 
ground, that touches a fence before being touched by a fielder or that clears a fence; 
(2) the batter reaches first base safely on a fair ball hit with such force, or so slowly, that any 
fielder attempting to make a play with the ball has no opportunity to do so; 
Rule 10.05(a)(2) Comment: The official scorer shall credit a hit if the fielder attempting to 
handle the ball cannot make a play, even if such fielder deflects the ball from or cuts off another 
fielder who could have put out a runner. 
(3) the batter reaches first base safely on a fair ball that takes an unnatural bounce so that a 
fielder cannot handle it with ordinary effort, or that touches the pitcher’s plate or any base 
(including home plate) before being touched by a fielder and bounces so that a fielder cannot 
handle the ball with ordinary effort; 
(4) the batter reaches first base safely on a fair ball that has not been touched by a fielder and that 
is in fair territory when the ball reaches the outfield, unless in the scorer’s judgment the ball 
could have been handled with ordinary effort; 
(5) a fair ball that has not been touched by a fielder touches a runner or an umpire, unless a 
runner is called out for having been touched by an Infield Fly, in which case the official scorer 
shall not score a hit; or 
(6) a fielder unsuccessfully attempts to put out a preceding runner and, in the official scorer’s 
judgment, the batter-runner would not have been put out at first base by ordinary effort. 
Rule 10.05(a) Comment: In applying Rule 10.05(a), the official scorer shall always give the 
batter the benefit of the doubt. A safe course for the official scorer to follow is to score a hit 
when exceptionally good fielding of a ball fails to result in a putout. 
Rule 10.05 to 10.06 
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(b) The official scorer shall not credit a base hit when a: 
(1) runner is forced out by a batted ball, or would have been forced out except for a fielding 
error; 
(2) batter apparently hits safely and a runner who is forced to advance by reason of the batter 
becoming a runner fails to touch the first base to which such runner is advancing and is called 
out on appeal. The official scorer shall charge the batter with a time at bat but no hit; 
(3) pitcher, the catcher or any infielder handles a batted ball and puts out a preceding runner who 
is attempting to advance one base or to return to his original base, or would have put out such 
runner with ordinary effort except for a fielding error. The official scorer shall charge the batter 
with a time at bat but no hit; 
(4) fielder fails in an attempt to put out a preceding runner and, in the scorer’s judgment, the 
batter-runner could have been put out at first base; or 
Rule 10.05(b) Comment: Rule 10.05(b) shall not apply if the fielder merely looks toward or 
feints toward another base before attempting to make the putout at first base. 
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(5) runner is called out for interference with a fielder attempting to field a batted ball, unless in 
the scorer’s judgment the batter-runner would have been safe had the interference not occurred.” 
 
To receive a run batted in (RBI) a player must: 
“A run batted in is a statistic credited to a batter whose action at bat causes one or more runs to 
score, as set forth in this Rule 10.04. 
(a) The official scorer shall credit the batter with a run batted in for every run that scores 
(1) unaided by an error and as part of a play begun by the batter’s safe hit (including the batter’s 
home run), sacrifice bunt, sacrifice fly, infield out or fielder’s choice, unless Rule 10.04(b) 
applies; 
(2) by reason of the batter becoming a runner with the bases full (because of a base on balls, an 
award of first base for being touched by a pitched ball or for interference or obstruction); or 
(3) when, before two are out, an error is made on a play on which a runner from third base 
ordinarily would score. 
(b) The official scorer shall not credit a run batted in 
(1) when the batter grounds into a force double play or a reverse-force double play; or 
(2) when a fielder is charged with an error because the fielder muffs a throw at first base that 
would have completed a force double play. 
(c) The official scorer’s judgment must determine whether a run batted in shall be credited for a 
run that scores when a fielder holds the ball or throws to a wrong base. Ordinarily, if the runner 
keeps going, the official scorer should credit a run batted in; if the runner stops and takes off 
again when the runner notices the misplay, the official scorer should credit the run as scored on a 
fielder’s choice.” 
 
In order to be credited with a stolen base a runner must: 
“The official scorer shall credit a stolen base to a runner whenever the runner advances one base 
unaided by a hit, a putout, an error, a force-out, a fielder’s choice, a passed ball, a wild pitch or a 
balk, subject to the following: 
(a) When a runner starts for the next base before the pitcher delivers the ball and the pitch results 
in what ordinarily is scored a wild pitch or passed ball, the official scorer shall credit the runner 
with a stolen base and shall not charge the misplay, unless, as a result of the misplay, the stealing 
runner advances an extra base, or another runner also advances, in which case the official scorer 
shall score the wild pitch or passed ball as well as the stolen base. 
(b) When a runner is attempting to steal, and the catcher, after receiving the pitch, makes a wild 
throw trying to prevent the stolen base, the official scorer shall credit the runner with a stolen 
base. The official scorer shall not charge an error unless thewild throw permits the stealing 
runner to advance one or more extra bases, or permits another runner to advance, in which case 
the official scorer shall credit the runner with the stolen base and charge one error to the catcher. 
 
Rule 10.07 
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(c) When a runner, attempting to steal, or after being picked off base, evades being put out in a 
run-down play and advances to the next base without the aid of an error, the official scorer shall 
credit the runner with a stolen base. If another runner also advances on the play, the official 
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scorer shall credit both runners with stolen bases. If a runner advances while another runner, 
attempting to steal, evades being put out in a run-down play and returns safely, without the aid of 
an error, to the base he originally occupied, the official scorer shall credit a stolen base to the 
runner who advances. 
(d) When a double- or triple-steal is attempted and one runner is thrown out before reaching and 
holding the base such runner is attempting to steal, no other runner shall be credited with a stolen 
base. 
(e) When a runner is tagged out after over sliding a base, while attempting either to return to that 
base or to advance to the next base, the official scorer shall not credit such runner with a stolen 
base. 
(f) When in the scorer’s judgment a runner attempting to steal is safe because of a muffed throw, 
the official scorer shall not credit a stolen base. The official scorer shall credit an assist to the 
fielder who made the throw, charge an error to the fielder who muffed the throw and charge the 
runner with “caught stealing.” 
(g) The official scorer shall not score a stolen base when a runner advances solely because of the 
defensive team’s indifference to the runner’s advance. The official scorer shall score such a play 
as a fielder’s choice. Rule 10.07(g) Comment: The scorer shall consider, in judging whether the 
defensive team has been indifferent to a runner’s advance, the totality of the circumstances, 
including the inning and score of the game, whether the defensive team had held the runner on 
base, whether the pitcher had made any pickoff attempts on that runner before the runner’s 
advance, whether the fielder ordinarily expected to cover the base to which the runner advanced 
made a move to cover such base, whether the defensive team had a legitimate strategic motive to 
not contest the runner’s advance or whether the defensive team might be trying impermissibly to 
deny the runner credit for a stolen base. For example, with runners on first and third bases, the 
official scorer should ordinarily credit a stolen base when the runner on first advances to second, 
if, in the scorer’s judgment, the defensive team had a legitimate strategic motive— namely, 
preventing the runner on third base from scoring on the throw to second base—not to contest the 
runner’s advance to second base. The official scorer may conclude that the defensive team is 
impermissibly trying to deny a runner credit for a stolen base if, for example, the defensive team 
fails to defend the advance of a runner approaching a league or career record or a league 
statistical title. 
(h) The official scorer shall charge a runner as “caught stealing” if such runner is put out, or 
would have been put out by errorless play, when such runner 
Rule 10.07 to 10.08 
98 
(1) tries to steal; 
(2) is picked off a base and tries to advance (any move toward the next base shall be considered 
an attempt to advance); or 
(3) over slides while stealing. 
Rule 10.07(h) Comment: In those instances where a pitched ball eludes the catcher and the 
runner  is put out trying to advance, the official scorer shall not charge any “caught stealing.” 
The official scorer shall not charge any caught stealing when a runner is awarded a base due to 
obstruction or when a runner is called out due to interference by the batter. The official scorer 
shall not charge a runner with a caught stealing if such runner would not have been credited with 
a stolen base had such runner been safe (for example, when a catcher throws the runner out after 
such runner tries to advance after a ball that had eluded the catcher on a pitch).” 
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  A pitcher can earn a win or a loss by:  
“Rule 10.17(a) Comment:  
Whenever the score is tied, the game becomes a new contest insofar as 
the winning pitcher is concerned. Once the opposing team assumes the lead, all pitchers who 
have pitched up to that point and have been replaced are excluded from being credited with the 
victory. If the pitcher against whose pitching the opposing team gained the lead continues to 
pitch until his team regains the lead, which it holds to the finish of the game, that pitcher shall be 
the winning pitcher. 
(b) If the pitcher whose team assumes a lead while such pitcher is in the game, or 
during the inning on offense in which such pitcher is removed from the game, and 
does not relinquish such lead, is a starting pitcher who has not completed 
(1) five innings of a game that lasts six or more innings on defense, or 
(2) four innings of a game that lasts five innings on defense, then the official scorer shall credit 
as the winning pitcher the relief pitcher, if there is only one relief pitcher, or the relief pitcher 
who, in the official scorer’s judgment was the most effective, if there is more than one relief 
pitcher. 
 
Rule 10.17(b) Comment: It is the intent of Rule 10.17(b) that a relief pitcher pitch at least one 
complete inning or pitch when a crucial out is made, within the context of the game (including 
the score), in order to be credited as the winning pitcher. If the first relief pitcher pitches 
effectively, the official scorer should not presumptively credit that pitcher with the win, because 
the rule requires that the win be credited to the pitcher who was the most effective, and a 
subsequent relief pitcher may have been most effective. The official scorer, in determining which 
relief pitcher was the most effective, should consider the number of runs, earned runs and base 
runners given up by each relief pitcher and the context of the game at the time of each relief 
pitcher’s appearance. If two or more relief pitchers were similarly effective, the official scorer 
should give the presumption to the earlier pitcher as the winning pitcher. (c) The official scorer 
shall not credit as the winning pitcher a relief pitcher who is ineffective in a brief appearance, 
when at least one succeeding relief pitcher pitches effectively in helping his team maintain its 
lead. In such a case, the official scorer shall credit as the winning pitcher the succeeding relief 
pitcher who was most effective, in the judgment of the official scorer.” 
A losing pitcher is a pitcher who is responsible for the run that gives the winning team a lead that 
the winning team does not relinquish. 
Rule 10.17(d) Comment: Whenever the score is tied, the game becomes a new contest insofar as 
the losing pitcher is concerned. 
(e) A league may designate a non-championship game (for example, the Major League All-Star 
Game) for which Rules 10.17(a)(1) and 10.17(b) do not apply. In such games, the official scorer 
shall credit as the winning pitcher that pitcher whose team assumes a lead while such pitcher is 
in the game, or during the inning on offense in which such pitcher is removed from the game, 
and does not relinquish such lead, unless such pitcher is knocked out after the winning team has 
attained a commanding lead and the official scorer concludes that a subsequent pitcher is entitled 
to credit as the winning pitcher.” 
 
An earned run can be defined as: 
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“An earned run is a run for which a pitcher is held accountable. In determining 
earned runs, the official scorer shall reconstruct the inning without the errors (which exclude 
catcher’s interference) and passed balls, giving the benefit of the doubt always to the pitcher in 
determining which bases would have been reached by runners had there been errorless play. For 
the purpose of determining earned runs, an intentional base on balls, regardless of the 
circumstances, shall be construed in exactly the same manner as any other base on balls.(a) The 
official scorer shall charge an earned run against a pitcher every time a runner reaches home base 
by the aid of safe hits, sacrifice bunts, a sacrifice fly, stolen 
bases, putouts, fielder’s choices, bases on balls, hit batters, balks or wild pitches 
(including a wild pitch on third strike that permits a batter to reach first base) before fielding 
chances have been offered to put out the offensive team. For the purpose of this rule, a defensive 
interference penalty shall be construed as a fielding chance. A wild pitch is solely the pitcher’s 
fault and shall contribute to an earned run just as a base on balls or a balk. 
Rule 10.16(a) Comment: The following are examples of earned runs charged to a pitcher: 
(1) Peter pitches and retires Abel and Baker, the first two batters of an inning. Charlie reaches 
first base on an error charged to a fielder. Daniel hits a home run. Edward hits a home run. Peter 
retires Frank to end the inning. Three runs have scored, but no earned runs are charged to Peter, 
because Charlie should have been the third out of the inning, as reconstructed without the error. 
(2) Peter pitches and retires Abel. Baker hits a triple. While pitching to Charlie, Peter throws a 
wild pitch, allowing Baker to score. Peter retires Daniel and Edward. One run has scored, 
charged as an earned run to Peter, because the wild pitch contributes to an earned run. In an 
inning in which a batter-runner reaches first base on a catcher’s interference, such batter runner 
shall not count as an earned run should he subsequently score. The official scorer shall not 
assume, however, that such batter would have made an out absent the catcher’s interference 
(unlike, for 
 
Rule 10.16 
108example, situations in which a batter-runner reaches first base safely because of a fielder’s 
misplay of a ball for an error). Because such batter never had a chance to complete his time at 
bat, it is unknown how such batter would have fared absent the catcher’s interference. Compare 
the following examples: 
(3) With two out, Abel reaches first on an error by the shortstop in misplaying a ground ball. 
Baker hits a home run. Charlie strikes out. Two runs have scored, but none is earned, because 
Abel’s at-bat should have been the third out of the inning, as reconstructed without the error. 
(4) With two out, Abel reaches first on a catcher’s interference. Baker hits a home run. Charlie 
strikes out. Two runs have scored, but one (Baker’s) is earned, because the official scorer cannot 
assume that Abel would have made an out to end the inning, absent the catcher’s interference. 
(b) No run shall be earned when scored by a runner who reaches first base 
(1) on a hit or otherwise after his time at bat is prolonged by a muffed foul fly; 
(2) because of interference or obstruction; or 
(3) because of any fielding error. 
(c) No run shall be earned when scored by a runner whose presence on the bases is prolonged by 
an error, if such runner would have been put out by errorless play. 
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(d) No run shall be earned when the scoring runner’s advance has been aided by an error, a 
passed ball or defensive interference or obstruction, if in the official scorer’s judgment the run 
would not have scored without the aid of such misplay. 
(e) An error by a pitcher is treated exactly the same as an error by any other fielder in computing 
earned runs. 
(f) Whenever a fielding error occurs, the pitcher shall be given the benefit of the doubt in 
determining to which bases any runners would have advanced had the fielding of the defensive 
team been errorless. 
(g) When pitchers are changed during an inning, the official scorer shall not charge the relief 
pitcher with any run (earned or unearned) scored by a runner who was on base at the time such 
relief pitcher entered the game, nor for runs scored by any runner 
who reaches base on a fielder’s choice that puts out a runner left on base by any 
preceding pitcher. 
 
Rule 10.16(g) Comment: It is the intent of Rule 10.16(g) to charge each pitcher with the number 
of runners he put on base, rather than with the individual runners. When a pitcher puts runners on 
base and is relieved, such pitcher shall be charged with all runs subsequently scored up to and 
including the number of runners such pitcher left on base when such pitcher left the game, unless 
such runners are put 
 
Rule 10.16 
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out without action by the batter (i.e., caught stealing, picked off base or called out for 
interference when ab atter-runner does not reach first base on the play). For example: 
(1) Peter is pitching. Abel reaches first base on a base on balls. Roger relieves Peter. Baker 
grounds out, advancing Abel to second base. Charlie flies out. Daniel singles, scoring Abel. 
Abel’s run is charged to Peter 
(2) Peter is pitching. Abel reaches first base on a base on balls. Roger relieves Peter. Baker 
forces Abel at second bases. Charlie grounds out, advancing Baker to second base. Daniel 
singles, scoring Baker. Baker’s run is charged to Peter. 
(3) Peter is pitching. Abel reaches first base on a base on balls. Roger relieves Peter. Baker 
singles, advancing Abel to third base. Charlie grounds to short, with Abel out at home plate and 
Baker advancing to second base. Daniel flies out. Edward singles, scoring Baker. Baker’s run is 
charged to Peter. 
(4) Peter is pitching. Abel reaches first base on a base on balls. Roger relieves Peter. Baker 
reaches on a base on balls. Charlie flies out. Abel is picked off second base. Daniel doubles, 
scoring Baker from first base. Baker’s run is charged to Roger. 
(5) Peter is pitching. Abel reaches first base on a base on balls. Roger relieves Peter. Baker 
reaches first base on a base on balls. Sierra relieves Roger. Charlie forces Abel at third base. 
Daniel forces Baker at third base. Edward hits a home run, scoring three runs. The official scorer 
shall charge one run to Peter, one run to Roger and one run to Sierra. 
(6) Peter is pitching. Abel reaches first base on a base on balls. Roger relieves Peter. Baker 
reaches first base on a base on balls. Charlie singles, filling the bases. Daniel forces Abel at 
home plate. Edward singles, scoring Baker and Charlie. The official scorer shall charge one run 
to Peter and one run to Roger. 
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(7) Peter is pitching. Abel reaches first base on a base on balls. Roger relieves Peter. Baker 
singles, but Abel is out trying to reach third base and Baker advances to second base on the 
throw. Charlie singles, scoring Baker. Baker’s run is charged to Roger. 
(h) A relief pitcher shall not be held accountable when the first batter to whom he 
pitches reaches first base on four called balls if such batter has a decided advantage in the ball 
and strike count when pitchers are changed. 
(1) If, when pitchers are changed, the count is 
2 balls, no strike, 
2 balls, 1 strike, 
3 balls, no strike, 
3 balls, 1 strike, 
3 balls, 2 strikes, 
and the batter gets a base on balls, the official scorer shall charge that batter 
and the base on balls to the preceding pitcher, not to the relief pitcher. 
(2) Any other action by such batter, such as reaching base on a hit, an error, a 
fielder’s choice, a force-out, or being touched by a pitched ball, shall cause 
such a batter to be charged to the relief pitcher. 
 
Rule 10.16 to 10.17 
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Rule 10.16(h) Comment: The provisions of Rule 10.16(h)(2) shall not be construed as affecting 
or 
conflicting with the provisions of Rule 10.16(g). 
(3) If, when pitchers are changed, the count is 
2 balls, 2 strikes, 
1 ball, 2 strikes, 
1 ball, 1 strike, 
1 ball, no strike, 
no ball, 2 strikes, 
no ball, 1 strike, 
the official scorer shall charge that batter and the actions of that batter to the 
relief pitcher. 
(i) When pitchers are changed during an inning, the relief pitcher shall not have the benefit of 
previous chances for outs not accepted in determining earned runs. 
Rule 10.16(i) Comment: It is the intent of Rule 10.16(i) to charge a relief pitcher with earned 
runs for which such relief pitcher is solely responsible. In some instances, runs charged as earned 
against the relief pitcher can be charged as unearned against the team. For example: 
(1) With two out and Peter pitching, Abel reaches first base on a base on balls. Baker reaches 
first base on an error. Roger relieves Peter. Charlie hits a home run, scoring three runs. The 
official scorer shall charge two unearned runs to Peter, one earned run to Roger and three 
unearned runs to the team (because the inning should have ended with the third out when Baker 
batted and an error was committed). 
(2) With two out, and Peter pitching, Abel and Baker each reach first base on a base on balls. 
Roger relieves Peter. Charlie reaches first base on an error. Daniel hits a home run, scoring four 
runs. The official scorer shall charge two unearned runs to Peter and two unearned runs to Roger 
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(because the inning should have ended with the third out when Charlie batted and an error was 
committed). 
(3) With none out and Peter pitching, Abel reaches first base on a base on balls. Baker reaches 
first base on an error. Roger relieves Peter. Charlie hits a home run, scoring three runs. Daniel 
and Edward strike out. Frank reaches first base on an error. George hits a home run, 
scoring two runs. The official scorer shall charge two runs, one of them earned, to Peter, three 
runs, one of them earned, to Roger and five runs, two of them earned, to the team(because only 
Abel and Charlie would have scored in an inning reconstructed without the errors).” 
 
 
According to Major League Baseball rules a pitcher records a save if they: 
 
“Rule 10.20 in the Official Rule Book states: 
Credit a pitcher with a save when he meets all three of the following conditions:  
(1) He is the finishing pitcher in a game won by his club; and  
(2) He is not the winning pitcher; and  
(3) He qualifies under one of the following conditions:  
- (a) He enters the game with a lead of no more than three runs and pitches for at least one 
inning; or  
- (b) He enters the game, regardless of the count, with the potential tying run either on base, or at 
bat, or on deck (that is, the potential tying run is either already on base or is one of the first two 
batsmen he faces; or  
- (c) He pitches effectively for at least three innings. No more than one save may be credited in 
each game.”  
 
“10.15 STRIKEOUTS 
A strikeout is a statistic credited to a pitcher and charged to a batter when the umpire calls three strikes on 
a batter, as set forth in this Rule 10.15. 
(a) The official scorer shall score a strikeout whenever a batter: 
(1) is put out by a third strike caught by the catcher; 
(2) is put out by a third strike not caught when there is a runner on first before two are out; 
 
Rule 10.15 to 10.16 
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(3) becomes a runner because a third strike is not caught; or 
(4) bunts foul on third strike, unless such bunt on third strike results in a foul fly caught by any fielder, in 
which case the official scorer shall not score a strikeout and shall credit the fielder who catches such foul 
fly with a putout. 
(b) When a batter leaves the game with two strikes against him, and the substitute batter completes a 
strikeout, the official scorer shall charge the strikeout and the time at bat to the first batter. If the 
substitute batter completes the turn at bat in any other manner, including a base on balls” 
 
( Retrieved from, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/downloads/y2011/Official_Baseball_Rules.pdf)  
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Appendix D 
Table 6 
Correlations of draft results 
 
